Notwithstanding the cliché phraseology – “deep commitment to strengthen the strategic partnership envisaged in the Riyadh Declaration of February 2010” – the joint statement issued at the end of MBS’s state visit failed to nail down Pakistan’s role as a State Sponsor of terrorism.
Is R&AW dreaded or dreadful, effective or affectlessly irrelevant, a proactive shaper of India’s history and foreign policy or a bumbling reactionary force? As R&AW turns 50 today, it is worth investigating its past in search of an answer. Like everything else about it, R&AW’s origin is shrouded in mystery.
The Indian tax payers’ have funded the Rafale deal. The government has executed the deal on behalf of the Indian citizens’ to strengthen India’s national security. Bolstering the capabilities of the Indian defence forces is an objective every Indian citizen unquestioningly supports. Therefore, its legitimate to ask and understand the need for hidden clauses within the Rafale contract.
This column is not to recount R N Kao’s successes or failures; he saw both in good measures. For despite the paucity, there have been some books both by his colleagues and some by later spies, one of whom had the good sense of recording him for posterity. Instead, this column is just to inspire us Indians – in a world where history is being slaughtered daily – to study our gradually eroding past.
For an enduring security of the CPEC, it is imperative for Pakistan to change its course from Quranic to sub-continental variety of Islam, but tragically it has regressed too deep for any course correction. A course correction would enjoin Pakistan to sever its links with its parallel military like Afghan-Taliban, e LeT or JeM. Is it possible?