Intelligence sharing is the most unsatisfactory aspect of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation. Before 26/11, the U.S. had hardly ever shared with India any worthwhile preventive intelligence. David Coleman Headley had been planning an attack on India in collaboration with the ISI and the LeT for a long time. This was known to the U.S. authorities. Perhaps they could have forced Pakistan to restrain their spy agency.
With more details of David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana's visit to India emerge, one question that remains unanswered is what were the Indian security and intelligence agencies doing while the terror duo were roaming freely across the country? Had FBI not tracked and arrested them we would never have known about their activities in India. They might have visited the country again and gathered information for the next terror attack.
The joint Indo-Pak statement, which was released after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's meeting with his Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of the NAM Summit in Egypt seemed to be an exercise in futility. Barring one or two points, it was a confusing statement. India's position till now has been that it would not renew dialogue with Pakistan unless appropriate action is taken against the people responsible for the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.