The fact is that Mr Modi visited US after his visit to Japan and immediately in the wake of hosting the Chinese President Xi Jinping, served as formidable diplomatic leverage. In the prevailing geopolitical situation, India’s weight can decide the scales of US-Japan-South Korea-Vietnam alliance vis-à-vis China-Pakistan-North Korea. To the US, India’s strategic stance is also decisive with regard to the geopolitical evolution of Russia. Mr Modi played these strategic leverages deftly and with consummate diplomatic skill.
For the first time in my recollection, the Pakistan Foreign Minister visiting New Delhi will attract more notice than US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.
In a meeting between then Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and then US Ambassador to India David Mulford, the former told the US not to tell India who to meet or not to meet. This was regarding Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s brief visit to New Delhi.
Without going into the merits or demerits of Gandhi’s statement, what is clear is that such an assertion before a foreign envoy – while keeping in mind that India at that time, and still continues to, was seeking American influence over Pakistan to clamp down on extremists groups targeting India – was not merely distasteful but smacked of naivety.
While the American president declared that India was no longer emerging, rather it had emerged, Cameron asserted that there wasn’t an issue in the world that didn’t beg China’s opinion and participation.
The two men also called for both the Asian giants to play a more constructive role in the development and growth of Africa. “It’s a huge market too; come now, let us not compete. Rather, we should explore it together,” they pleaded. Alright, they didn’t say that exactly. But it did sound more or less like that.
The two leaders agreed to deepen existing regular strategic consultations on developments in East Asia, and decided to expand and intensify their strategic consultations to cover regional and global issues of mutual interest, including Central and West Asia.
Intelligence sharing is the most unsatisfactory aspect of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation. Before 26/11, the U.S. had hardly ever shared with India any worthwhile preventive intelligence.
David Coleman Headley had been planning an attack on India in collaboration with the ISI and the LeT for a long time. This was known to the U.S. authorities. Perhaps they could have forced Pakistan to restrain their spy agency.