The attacks on Indians and Indian establishments in Afghanistan are rising in the last few years.  The Indian and Afghan government have blamed Pakistan for the deadly attacks. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames India for training Baloch and Sindhi insurgents from their bases in Afghanistan.

The truth is that after the defeat of the Taliban (who captured power with the help of Pakistan), Afghanistan has become a new battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry. Both the countries are trying their best to increase their influence in the country.

According to security experts, Pakistan-based terror organizations — with help from Inter-Services Intelligence — have set up hundreds of terror cells/modules across India. A terror module is a functional unit which includes one or more terror cells. Every cell works independently of the other and the handlers in Pakistan manage these cells without worrying about the Indian agencies.

The recurring terror strikes in our country suggests that the Indian agencies does not have the required human intelligence about the numerous cells and modules that operate here.

In simple language, there was complete intelligence blackout. None of the intelligence agencies had made any effort to penetrate the modules and cells which normally function from within the clustered Muslim areas in and around Pune and nearby towns.

Such continuous failure to generate Human Intelligence and absence of sophisticated Electronic Intelligence is unpardonable.

Among the numerous viewpoints regarding India’s potential to make it to the big league, one of the most important opinions held by many analysts is that India has even failed to decisively counter the challenge of terrorism directed towards it from its neighbour, which is one-eighth its size.

Experts opine that the defeat and humiliation at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 has been largely overlooked in the planning of future strategies. According to them, there is a lot of hype about India’s emergence as a great power. But as we take credit for limited successes against a small adversary, there is little or no public knowledge of a well laid out doctrine regarding future engagement with a superior power like China.