Jack Anderson, an American investigative journalist, first reported about the US tilt towards Pakistan under secret orders from then President Richard Nixon. Anderson got the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting in 1972 for his reports on US’ tilt away from India.

The United States administration had ordered a high-level inquiry into the special reports by Anderson in The Washington Post on December 14 and December 16, 1971.

The Delhi High Court on July 16 directed the Union government to place before it the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report.

The court issued a notice to the government to file its response on a petition filed by veteran journalist Kuldip Nayar.

The report, lying with the Defence Ministry for over 45 years now, was a result of the government inquiry into the humiliating defeat at the hands of China in the 1962 border war.

The Government of India still treats the report as a classified document and have no concrete reasons for not making it public after so many years.

The Indian government’s record in declassifying past records is appalling compared to mature democracies like the United States where even war secrets are declassified after the usual 30-year period. And in the “world’s largest democracy” important documents relating to our history are not made public on flimsy grounds.

There are different views on the Indian policy towards China and the Tibet issue. I will write more on that some other day. I have reproduced here the letter written by then Deputy Prime Minister of India Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on November 7, 1950 on Tibet issue.

The letter throws light on the thought process of the Indian government vis-a-vis Tibet and China in the initial years after the independence.

On July 2, 1999 Sharif called President Clinton and requested him to intervene. The President also consulted with then Indian Prime Minister A B Vajpayee who clearly stated that India will not negotiate “under the threat of aggression” and that withdrawal of Pakistani forces was essential.

Sharif again called President Clinton on July 3 and told him that he was ready to come to Washington. The President warned him that without agreeing to withdraw Pakistani forces behind the LoC, the visit will not yield any results. Sharif told him that he was coming to the US on July 4.

When Mrs Indira Gandhi again became Prime Minister in 1980, she recalled Kao from his retirement and appointed him as her senior advisor on internal and external developments. She used to consult him on political and intelligence matters. His professional guidance was of general nature.

In one major development, when Mrs Gandhi wanted to go USA she was not getting her choice of appointment date with the US President through External Affairs Ministry channels. Kao through his friend George Bush Senior – who was then US Ambassador in China – arranged her meeting with the US President.